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ABSTRACT 
 This thesis explains when and how Latin American leaders use diversionary force 
and the rally around the flag phenomenon in order to help shore up domestic support. 
This better understanding will allow policy makers to better predict Latin American 
leaders’ actions and to construct more specifically tailored foreign policies toward the 
region. The use of diversionary force by Latin American leaders has a broad history, and 
this thesis focuses on two case studies: Alberto Fujimori and his use of diversionary 
tactics against domestic terrorism threats, especially Sendero Luminoso in Peru, and 
Nicolás Maduro’s inflation of the threat of a U.S. or Western-led invasion of Venezuela. 
The thesis concludes that both autocratic regimes used diversionary tactics frequently, 
and continued to employ them regardless of the viability of the threat and the 
independence of other political institutions. As the situation in Latin America 
deteriorates, there is a pressing need to comprehend the inflammatory rhetoric of 
autocrats like Maduro in order to further U.S. efforts to create and implement a more 
constructive foreign policy toward the region. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Diversionary threats are part of the repertoire of foreign affairs. North Korean 
Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un called for a new round of ballistic missile tests to be 
conducted in 2017, despite no substantial improvement or innovation in either delivery or 
warheads. Every time North Korea conducts a missile test, the North Korean state media 
propagates the message that the missiles are to protect North Koreans against an American, 
South Korean, or Japanese invasion—despite the fact that such an invasion is entirely 
unlikely. Moreover, even though its moribund economy continuously struggles, North 
Korea “is spending about a third of its national income on its military.”1 This type of 
diversionary behavior is not unique to North Korea. Although Latin America is generally 
considered a pacific region, diversionary threats also exist there. The purpose of this thesis 
is to determine when and why governments choose to use the threat of foreign invasion, 
intervention, or domestic terrorism, with a particular emphasis on Latin American leaders. 
The use of diversionary force and the rally around the flag effect are covered in this thesis 
because of their direct connection to the inflation of threats, both foreign and domestic, to 
shore up legitimacy. Overall, in this thesis, I seek to understand when and how Latin 
American leaders use the threat of force, especially in the democratic era. 
A. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
A military invasion has historically been one of the most daunting and traumatic 
events a nation could experience and the very idea of it holds resonance. In the United 
States during the Cold War, portrayals of Communist troops parachuting into America 
played havoc on the American psyche, regardless of any actual attack ever taking place. It 
is important for state leaders to appear capable of defending their nations, or even being 
able to threaten others. This reasoning is useful when attempting to explain why North 
Korean leaders would aggressively test ballistic missiles, or why Venezuelan leaders would 
1 Ju-min Park, “New Nuclear-capable Missile Test a Success, North Korea Says,” Reuters, February 
13, 2017, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-missiles-nk-idUSKBN15R10O; “North Korea 
Spends about a Third of Income on Military: Group,” Reuters, January 18, 2011, http://ca.reuters.com/
article/topNews/idCATRE70H1BW20110118. 
2 
buy expensive fighter planes just to parade them down the streets of Caracas. The notion 
that a foreign state or domestic terrorist group could invade and harm its citizens has a 
powerful rallying effect on a population, and astute world leaders are well aware of this 
phenomenon.  
A better understanding and exploration of why and when a government would use 
external threat (e.g., foreign invasion) or internal threats (e.g., domestic terrorism) would 
assist foreign policy makers when dealing with a seemingly belligerent foreign leader, and 
allow them to more comprehensively view their actions and security policies within the 
context of another nation’s domestic situation. The U.S. Navy has historically conducted 
and continues to conduct missions on a routine basis for political purposes. As the 
Department of the Navy’s mission increases in Central and South America, it arguably 
must understand the impact of its actions on the region’s democratically elected 
governments. Having a more sensitive gauge of Latin American leaders’ response to 
foreign actions, despite the actions intended task, may help the U.S. Department of Defense 
and State Department, as well as other Latin American nations, produce more effective 
foreign policy.  
Latin America has a history of populist leaders who have been susceptible to issues 
of legitimacy. Among the rash of dictators and generals who controlled many Latin 
American countries, both before and after the Cold War, each had to deal extensively with 
internal unrest. The sheer frequency of governmental turnover, especially successful 
military coups, made many administration’s hold on power seem tenuous.2 This sensitivity 
to domestic legitimacy makes leaders who may have achieved their positions by 
nontraditional means, including legacies of coups d’état, especially vulnerable to using 
diversionary force tactics. The preponderance of democracies in Latin America ensure that 
maintaining the semblance of domestic legitimacy is paramount to retaining power 
regionally and domestically.3 Using the threat of foreign invasion, intervention or domestic 
                                                 
2 R. H. Dix, “Military Coups and Military Rule in Latin America,” Armed Forces & Society 20, no 3, 
(1994): 439, doi:10.1177/0095327x9402000307. 
3 Arturo Valenzuela, “Latin American Presidencies Interrupted,” Journal of Democracy 15, no. 4, 
(2004): 10, https://muse.jhu.edu/. 
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violence would be especially appealing to these leaders who only have a tenuous grasp on 
power and claim to legitimacy. This project will attempt to view as clearly as possible how 
diversionary force and the rally around the flag phenomenon can affect a leader’s 
legitimacy and, in turn, allow policy makers to better predict Latin American leaders’ 
actions, as well as construct more specifically tailored foreign policies toward the region.  
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
National leaders and foreign policy makers frequently deal with numerous diverse 
and powerful factors when formulating policy, factors which can help explain how and 
when international conflict can occur. Leaders often take into account the exhaustive list 
of environmental variables that provide decision-making context.4 Morgan and Bickers 
argue that what is of “critical importance…is the realization that foreign policy decisions 
are primarily political decisions that are made in an expressly political context. Decisions 
regarding international conflict are, as with any policy decisions, affected by the pushing 
and pulling of competing domestic interest.”5  
Diversionary war theory is one attempt to explain a state’s security policy, 
especially adventurous military policies including war, as a means of diverting public 
attention away from either executive consolidation efforts or domestic issues.6 According 
to the diversionary theory of war, the initiation of some military conflicts can be attributed 
to national leaders attempting to divert public attention away from domestic issues by 
engaging in militarized foreign policies in an attempt to consolidate and shore up domestic 
support. The leadership may attempt to divert domestic discontent by creating a rally 
around the flag effect in order to bolster their political position.7 
  
                                                 
4 Clifton T. Morgan and Kenneth N. Bickers, “Domestic Discontent and the External Use of Force,” 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 36, no. 1 (March 1992): 26. 
5 Morgan and Bickers, “Domestic Discontent and the External Use of Force,” 26. 
6 Morgan and Bickers, 26. 
7 Bruce Russet, Controlling the Sword (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990).  
4 
This literature review is organized by categories based on different theories of 
approaches to war, including realist, constructivist, and liberal. A major difference 
regarding diversionary theory between the realists and the other two is that realist theorists 
treat each nation as a whole, sidelining fundamental differences in domestic institutions 
and constituencies. Constructivist and liberal theorists place far more credence on how the 
leaders are elected as well as how quickly and directly they are accountable to their citizens.  
1. The Realist Theory of War 
Realism has four main assumptions; the international system is anarchic, states are 
the primary actors, states within a given system are unitary and rational actors, and survival 
is the primary concern for all states.8 Realism downplays the importance of individuals 
and institutions and views the international system as comprising states which are 
constantly vying for power and influence in the world. Thomas Hobbes’ perception of 
humanity, that it is inherently egocentric and conflictual unless there are external 
conditions which create coexistence, is a basis for understanding realist theory.9 Realists 
argue the international system is a zero-sum game, where any single actor’s success is 
another actor’s loss. Morgenthau summarizes the ideals of realism when he states, 
“whatever the ultimate aims of international politics, power is always the immediate 
aim.”10  
A realist interpretation supports the diversionary force theory, as it contends that 
someone in power acts to maintain their position; under this perspective a leader could see 
a rational benefit to using diversionary force or artificially inflating security threats to 
perpetuate a rally around the flag effect. For example, Mitchell and Prins conducted a study 
exploring the relationships between states, arguing that a history of rivalry would increase 
                                                 
8 Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, trans. Luigi Ricci and E. R. P. Vincent (New York, NY: Modern 
Library, 1950); Edward Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919–1939, 2nd ed. (New York, NY: Macmillan, 
1956); Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Around Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 3rd ed. (New 
York, NY: McGraw-Hill, 1961). 
9 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathon, ed. Michael Oakeshott (New York, NY: Macmillan, 1962), originally 
published in 1651. 
10 Morgenthau, Politics Around Nations, 27. 
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a state’s likelihood of employing diversionary force.11 The idea of an enduring 
rivalrybetween two states assumes the states are naturally opposed in a zero-sum 
environment, and that the relationship between two states could help explain the realist 
theory for why a state would use diversionary threats. Their study concludes that while 
economic hardship, especially monetary inflation, increases the probability of militarized 
dispute initiated in settings of rivalry, it actually decreases the chances of a dispute in non-
rivalry settings. They argue that enduring rivalry gives the leader more political opportunity 
to use military force.12 This idea is supported by Bennett and Nordstrom in their study on 
enduring rivalries in which they concluded that states in persistent, long-standing rivalries 
have two main options to address a worsening economy.13 The states can address this by 
“either (1) escalating conflict within the rivalry to gain the benefits of a diversionary 
conflict or (2) seeking to settle the rivalry to free up resources that can be directed toward 
dealing with economic problems.”14 
Other studies attempt to measure the effects and performance of diversionary 
force.15 The studies agree that since war is costly and a state can bargain, the leader would 
attempt to peacefully appease a domestic situation by negotiating with elites and the 
electorate, rather than attempt to use diversionary force. Diversionary force is more useful 
when a leader is attempting to demonstrate competence rather than cause a short rally 
around the flag effect. Diversionary behavior typically involves short actions of war 
including economic sanctions or military force short of open armed conflict, and the shorter 
they are, the more effective they are. These studies demonstrate the limitations of 
diversionary force and how actions less than full war can still be considered diversionary 
                                                 
11 Sara McLaughlin Mitchell and Brandon C. Prins, “Rivalry and Diversionary Uses of Force,” 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 48, (2004): 940. 
12 Mitchell and Prins, “Rivalry and Diversionary Uses of Force,” 940. 
13 D. Scott Bennett, and Timothy Nordstrom “Foreign Policy Substitutability and Internal Economic 
Problems in Enduring Rivalries,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 44, (2000): 35. 
14 Bennett, and Nordstrom “Foreign Policy Substitutability and Internal Economic Problems in 
Enduring Rivalries,” 35. 
15 T. Clifton Morgan and Kenneth N. Bickers, “Domestic discontent and the external use of force,” 
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 36, (1992): 32; Ahmer Tarar, “Diversionary Incentives and the Bargaining 
Approach to War,” International Studies Quarterly 50, (2006): 172. 
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actions, possibly even more effective than war. This definition of diversionary theory 
increases the scope of the theory allowing for shows of force, threats to use force, and the 
use of force short of war, to be meaningfully incorporated into the research.16  
2. The Constructivist Theory of War 
Constructivism focuses on better defining the character of the international 
structure and how that structure defines the identities of states. A core concept of 
constructivism is that ideas, values, and cultural identities shape the international system 
in more powerful and profound ways than realists acknowledge. As a result, constructivists 
perceive the international system itself as a complicated social construct, not comprised 
simply of consolidated, independent state actors. As Finnemore explains, “interests are not 
just ‘out there’ waiting to be discovered; they are constructed through social interaction.”17 
Constructivist theory also gives credence to international institutions, in that they can 
change state identities and interests.18  
The diversionary war theory’s theoretical origins lie in the sociological literature, 
which centered on the idea of the interactions between in-groups and out-groups.19 The in-
group/out-group hypothesis, as stated by Simmel, contends that a group can become more 
cohesive by coming into conflict with an alternate external entity.20 Simmel argues that 
conflict unifies members and “subjects them to uniform impulse” that they are forced to 
embrace or repel.21 He argues that war could be a last chance for a state to maintain 
cohesion despite being “ridden with inner antagonisms.”22 
                                                 
16 Morgan and Bickers, “Domestic Discontent,” 32. 
17 Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society, (Cornell University Press, 1996). 
18Alexander Wendt, “Anarch is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” 
International Organizations 46, no. 2 (Spring 1992): 394. 
19 Georg Simmel, Conflict and the Web of Group Affiliations, (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1955); Louis 
Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict, (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1956). 
20 Simmel, “Conflict and the Web,”93. 
21 Simmel, 93. 
22 Simmel, 93. 
7 
There is substantial literature devoted to the study of diversionary theory in the 
United States that applies in-group/out-group theory. Studies conducted by Mueller, Brody 
and Page, and McKuen found that the diversionary theory holds true in cases of U.S. 
politics, showing that elements of the in-group/out-group theory can be applied 
successfully at the national level.23 Their reports indicated increases in popular support for 
governments as a result of foreign policy activities. These works present evidence that the 
existence or the perception of the existence, of an external national threat promotes group 
unity. Mueller’s introduction of the “rally-round-the-flag” was, as he defined it, the rush of 
nationalism that occurs when the nation’s leader attempts to focus the public’s attention 
“beyond the water’s edge” as the primary basis of the rally phenomenon.24  
3. The Liberal Theory of War 
Liberalism places more emphasis on state preferences, as opposed to state 
capabilities, as the primary determinant of state behavior. In this school of thought, the 
state is no longer viewed as a unitary actor; instead state institutions, governmental 
structure, economics and culture are powerful factors when considering state decision 
making.25 The three core assumptions of liberalism, as posed by Moravcsik, includes the 
primacy of societal actors, that states represent a subset of domestic society, and the 
interdependent nature of the international system.26 The second point is particularly 
important to this research because it contends that policy is “constrained by the underlying 
identities, interests, and power of individuals or groups (inside and outside the state 
apparatus) who constantly pressure the central decision makers to pursue policies 
                                                 
23 John Mueller, “Presidential popularity from Truman to Johnson,” American Political Science and 
Review 64 (1970): 20; John Mueller, “War, Presidents, and Public Opinion,” (New York: Wiley, 1993); 
Richard Brody and Benjamin Page, “The Impact of Events on the Presidential Popularity; The Johnson and 
Nixon Administration,” in Perspectives on the Presidency, ed. Aaron Wildavsky (Boston, MA: Little, 
Brown, 1975), 137; M. MacKuen, “Political drama, economic conditions, and the dynamic of presidential 
popularity,” America Journal of Political Science 27, (1983): 166. 
24 Mueller, “Presidential Popularity,” 25. 
25 Andrew Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics,” 
International Organization 51, no. 4 (1997): 513. 
26 Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously,” 520. 
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consistent with their preferences.”27 This idea of representation, or the lack of 
representation, can help explain why and when a government makes foreign policy, 
because whichever subset of society is most represented in the government will likely make 
foreign policy choices that will increase its administration’s authority. 
Liberalism is prevalent in literature about diversionary force theory as it helps 
explain the differences in the choices different states make. Many authors focus on how 
democracies and autocracies behave regarding domestic unrest or other challenges to their 
legitimacy.28 By allowing insight into the intrastate workings of a particular government, 
liberalism helps increase the literature’s understanding of when and why a government 
would use diversionary force or artificially inflate threats. 
The institutional approach, as described by Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, Silvers, 
and Smith posits that the primary desire of leaders is to remain in their respective political 
positions.29 The power and privileges that accompany a governmental administrative role 
appeal to the leader and they will not surrender their political leadership easily. They are 
constantly attempting to appease their domestic constituents in order to remain in their 
positions. The institutional approach argues that the leaders must appeal to two different 
levels of support to remain in power; the electorate who have an institutional say in 
choosing leaders, and the minimal grouping of people necessary to retain enough support 
to remain in office.30 Diversionary force is one way in which leaders can appeal to both 
levels of support because it uses the rally around the flag effect to unify both support groups  
                                                 
27 Moravcsik, 518. 
28 Christopher Gelpi, “Democratic Diversions: Governmental Structure and the Externalization of 
Domestic Conflict,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 41, (1997): 257; Jeffery Pickering and Emizet F. 
Kisangani, “Democracy and Diversionary Military Intervention,” International Studies Quarterly 49, 
(2005): 25; Ross A. Miller, “Domestic structures and the diversionary use of force,” American Journal of 
Political Science 39, (1995):765; David Sobek, “Rallying Around the Podesta: Testing Diversionary 
Theory Across Time,” Journal of Peace Research 44, (2007): 30. 
29 Bueno de Mesquita et al., “An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace,” American 
Political Science Review 93, (1999): 794. 
30Jeffery Pickering and Emizet F. Kisangani, “Democracy and Diversionary Military Intervention,” 
International Studies Quarterly 49, (2005): 27. 
9 
Despite over five decades of research into diversionary theory, empirical evidence 
supporting the causal relationship between domestic turmoil and adventurous foreign 
policy has been contradictory.31 Gelpi argues that the reason for this variance is because 
most empirical studies focus primarily on the enticements political leaders have to actually 
employ force and fail to consider the alternative solutions for quelling domestic unrest.32 
He contends that by distinguishing between authoritarian and democratic leaders the results 
would change. His study supported his hypothesis by demonstrating that democratic 
leaders are more likely to use diversionary force to divert public attention away from the 
home front, while authoritarian rulers would more likely use direct force to settle unrest, 
causing them to be less vulnerable to use diversionary force.33 Meernik and Waterman, in 
studying diversionary force regarding U.S. presidents, find little evidence linking domestic 
political conditions and the use of force internationally.34 They also contend that the rallies 
that occurred as a result of the use of diversionary force were short-lived and ultimately 
ineffective in order to secure a leader’s long-term success in office.35 Note, however, that 
Fearon argues democracies present their intentions more clearly and credibly than 
nondemocracies, “ameliorating the security dilemma between democratic states,” therefore 
actually decreasing its preference to use force.36   
Much work has been done on the relationship between regime type and a leader’s 
propensity to use diversionary force. Kisangani and Pickering argue that the definition of 
regime type has not been fully explored in the literature on the use of diversionary force. 
They differentiate between mature and consolidating democracies, stating that 
consolidating democracies are more likely to use diversionary force than mature 
                                                 
31 Brett Ashley Leeds and David R. Davis, “Domestic political vulnerability and international 
disputes,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 41, (1997): 820; Jack Levy, “The Causes of War and the 
Conditions of Peace,” Annual Review of Political Science 1, (1998): 144. 
32 Gelpi, “Democratic Diversions,” 275. 
33 Gelpi, 275. 
34 James Meernik and Peter Waterman, “The Myth of the Diversionary use of Force by American 
Presidents,” Political Research Quarterly 49, (1996): 575. 
35 Meernik and Waterman, “The Myth of the Diversionary Use of Force,” 575. 
36 James D. Fearon, “Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes,” The 
American Political Science Review, (1994): 577.  
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democracies. They also contend that there is a similar relationship between an established 
autocracy and a “new cohort,” that the established autocracies place a preference on 
repression as opposed to the new cohorts, who would be more likely to use diversionary 
force.37 Regardless of which regime type studied, Kisangani and Pickering content that 
when an administration is politically vulnerable, it increased the probability that a leader 
would employ diversionary tactics.38  
Miller’s work on the importance of political structure regarding a leader’s 
preference to use diversionary force began a transition away from realist theory and began 
examining how a nation’s internal distribution of power can constrain foreign policy 
makers.39 He argues that domestic structures are important regardless of the type of 
government; distribution of power within a state can impose constraints that make 
government structure and domestic considerations relatively unimportant in making 
foreign policy choices. Miller concludes that domestic structures do have an effect on the 
propensity of foreign policy makers to use diversionary force to further their personal 
political ambitions.40 Sobek attempts to go beyond the conventional scope of the literature 
by examining seven different examples in Renaissance Italy (1250-1494) in order to 
analyze the effect of regime change on a government’s propensity to use diversionary 
force.41 The city-states examined switch periodically decidedly republican regimes to 
largely oligarchic regimes, thus providing an appropriate context to analyze the varying 
behaviors between democratic and oligarchic administrations. Sobek’s concluded that 
oligarchies were more likely than republics to initiate wars during times of domestic 
turmoil. Republics, conversely, showed a propensity to use force against city-states that 
were undergoing challenges to their republican systems.42  
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A major issue in the literature has been the difficulty in isolating domestic unrest 
as the major factor a leader would choose to engage in militaristic foreign policies.43 Tir 
contends that it is territorial disputes which are the major factor in allowing leaders to use 
diversionary force; the public tend to react to territorial issues intensely, and the “embattled 
leader could attempt to manipulate and exploit this proclivity by launching specifically a 
territorial conflict”.44 Tir’s research, however, concludes that that the initiation of military 
force over disputed territory is linked to economic underperformance.  
4. Conclusion of Literature Review 
Each of the three major schools of thought in international relations gives us 
different insight as to why and when a country will use the threat of foreign invasion. The 
realist school can provide insight by arguing a state’s desire for power and security is a 
paramount driving force and all other actions and policy choices reflect that desire. The 
constructivist school of thought allows for the study of the more diverse desires of a state 
and includes society and culture as important aspects when envisioning foreign policy 
decisions. Liberalism places an added emphasis on economics and state and international 
institutions, all of which could play a key role in influencing policy makers. These three 
schools of thought show that power, security, economics, social or cultural factors can help 
determine why and when a government would use the threat of foreign invasion, 
intervention or even domestic security threats.  
C. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
The three theories of war—realism, constructivism, and liberalism – provide 
competing explanations for when and why a government may use security threats to 
generate a rally around the flag effect. 
The concept of legitimacy can serve as an explanatory variable for the pursuit of 
diversionary policies. I will utilize Weber’s model of legitimacy, which is the idea that 
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legitimate domination is maintained through the motivations of obedience. He speaks to 
three different kinds of legitimacy: traditional, charismatic, and legal-rational.45 All three 
types of legitimacy are acceptable to create the consent of the governed; however, in 
democracies, rule of law and adherence to a constitution are the standards for measuring 
legitimacy. There must be an aspect regarding the consent of the governed in order for the 
leader to lead with any degree of legitimacy.46 The level of legitimacy a leader enjoys, 
especially in a democracy, can be determined by polls, frequency and degree of civil unrest, 
and elections, among other quantifiable factors. 
The first hypothesis, coming from the realist school, is if legitimacy is waning for 
a particular leader, then they will likely use diversionary threats of war to shore up 
legitimacy. Since a leader in power wants to remain in power, diversionary threats are 
invariably an option. Regardless of the strength of a state’s democratic institutions, 
diversionary threats would be a viable way for a leader to shore up domestic support. The 
next hypothesis is constructivist, in that a state’s society and culture would be driving 
forces behind the decision to use diversionary force. If a state uses diversionary tactics to 
build in-group and out-group identities, then there should be evidence of government 
officials using identity-based politics focusing on such markers as class, ethnicity or faith. 
The final hypothesis is that democratic states are more likely to use diversionary force than 
autocratic states. An autocratic state has more traditional options, including overt 
repression, while a democratic state has to alleviate domestic unrest within the confines of 
rule of law and respect for civil liberties. A democratically elected government would be 
more likely to use diversionary tactics before it attempted any sort of overt repression. The 
liberal theory of war suggests that the workings of domestic politics, which are conditioned 
by both international and state institutions, explain diversionary tactics.  
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D. RESEARCH DESIGN
The research design will analyze evidence for each of the three hypotheses by
assessing evidence in two case studies: Peru’s pursuit of a Maoist insurgent group, Sendero 
Luminoso, or Shining Path; and Venezuela during the transition from Hugo Chavez to 
Nicolas Maduro.47 Sources utilized will include peer-reviewed books, journal articles, 
public opinion polling data, and other academic research. Contemporary news articles will 
also be important because they may reflect public perception of leadership and focus. 
The first case study, Peru, will focus on President Alberto Fujimori’s war against 
Shining Path in 1992 when the leader of the insurgency, Abimael Guzman, was captured. 
This case is distinct from the Venezuelan case in that the threat to the regime was domestic. 
Sources to determine public opinion before, during, and after the operation will be reflected 
in the contemporary local media, including newspapers, public opinion polls, and academic 
writing. Comparing the change in public opinion will indicate the level of success the 
diversionary force achieved, and low public opinion prior to the capture of Guzman could 
be considered a trigger for the employment of diversionary force.48 
The second case study focuses on Venezuela’s foreign policy during the transition 
from Hugo Chavez to Nicolas Maduro, covering the years 2012 to 2016. Chavez constantly 
employed security threat rhetoric while Maduro, during his first year in office, put 
Venezuelan troops on emergency alert in anticipation of an American invasion. This 
research will compare changes in Maduro’s rhetoric and public opinion over the three-year 
time-frame using the same criteria and media sources as the Peruvian case study. 
E. THESIS OVERVIEW
The first chapter of this thesis has primarily focused on providing definitions of key
terms, introducing my argument, and expanding the review of existing literature. The 
second chapter will focus on the Peruvian case study of Fujimori’s regime; and the third 
47 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, “Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social 
Sciences,” (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2007), 75. 
48 John Gerring, Social Science Methodology: A Criterial Framework, (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. 
Press, 2010), 217. 
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chapter the Venezuelan case study. Finally, in the conclusion, I will present the results of 
the thesis, evaluate the competing hypotheses, and consider implications for Latin 
American foreign policy. 
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II. ALBERTO FUJIMORI: USE OF DIVERSIONARY TACTICS 
AGAINST DOMESTIC TERRORISM TO INCREASE DOMESTIC 
SUPPORT FOR HIGH-RISK POLITICAL MANEUVERS 
For the nation of Peru, 1992 was a year filled with dramatic events with substantial 
consequences: Fujimori’s dissolution of the Peruvian congress, the election of a single-
chamber congress, and an increase in violent attacks perpetuated by Sendero Luminoso 
(Shining Path), resulting in the capture of the organization’s leader. Less than two years 
after winning a dramatic democratic election as a major underdog, President Alberto 
Fujimori’s autogolpe (the dissolving of Congress in 1992 by the executive), put him and 
his administration in the precarious position of being without constitutional legitimacy, in 
a nation where the constitution was the law of the land. Many of the events prior to the 
1992 capture of Abimael Guzman (the leader and founder of Sendero Luminoso), two years 
into Fujimori’s election, challenged the constitutional form of government, as well as 
threatened the government’s monopoly on the legitimate use of power, thereby challenging 
its legitimacy.  
There were many reasons why Alberto Fujimori used diversionary tactics in the 
suppression of Sendero Luminoso, a domestic security threat that challenged the legitimacy 
of the regime. The inability to completely control the public narrative, his role as a populist 
(with the inherent vulnerabilities of needing constant popular support), and the opportunity 
to conduct suppressive operations against Sendero Luminoso—as a near-universally 
reviled organization— presented Fujimori’s regime with credible reasons to employ 
diversionary tactics. This chapter seeks to explain the extent of President Fujimori’s use of 
diversionary force against a domestic security group in the form of operations suppressing 
Sendero Luminoso, leading to the capture of Sendero Luminoso’s leader, Abimael 
Guzman, in September of 1992. It will also explore his role as a populist leader and 
manipulation of the free press in order to maximize the impact of Guzman’s capture. 
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A. FUJIMORI’S RISE TO POWER AND CONSOLIDATION AS A 
POPULIST LEADER 
Alberto Fujimori’s election in 1990 was extraordinary in Peru’s history for several 
reasons. Peru’s established political parties were unable to garner enough support to 
succeed in the election, after the failed presidency of Alan Garcia (1985–1990) had 
tarnished the American Popular Revolutionary (APRA) Party, the coalition of leftist parties 
that had a strong running in 1985 split in 1989.49 The two remaining conservative parties 
forming a coalition to endorse the candidacy of the novelist-turn-politician Mario Vargas 
Llosa, the only true challenge to Fujimori during the 1990 election.50 Fujimori led a 
populist campaign as an outsider, and challenged the established parties by providing a 
political alternative to the current system. Philip Mauceri, in his book “State of Siege: 
Development and Policy Making in Peru,” introduces the Fujimori campaign by stating 
that “few observers expected Alberto Fujimori, an unknown ex-university rector, to eclipse 
the traditional political parties or the well-financed campaign of the internationally famed 
novelist Mario Vargas Llosa in the 1990 presidential elections.”51 However, Fujimori’s 
campaign successfully completed the unlikely upset. 
Vargas’ proposal to address the fiscal environment and economic downturn that 
Peru was trudging through involved austerity measures and other liberal economic reforms 
aligned with the “Washington consensus.”52 The Washington consensus consisted of a 
series of reforms designed to end inflation and promote direct foreign investment, but came 
at an enormous cost, forcing the privatization of nationally owned industries, which would 
have likely resulted in Peru’s natural resources becoming owned by foreign investors.53 
These policies did not resonate with a public that was well aware of the difficulty that 
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austerity measures would bring. Vargas’ proposition included structural reforms that would 
in turn lay off government workers, making his campaign appear to be endorsing the stance 
that unemployment and hardship were acceptable costs to improving the Peruvian economy 
at large.54 Vargas’ campaign promised to end the economic downturn but at the expense 
of the lower and middle classes. His campaign appeared detached and uncaring, especially 
coming from the educated, elitist Vargas, when juxtaposed against Fujimori’s populist 
rhetoric.  
In direct contrast to Vargas’ austerity plan, Fujimori campaigned by appealing to 
the lower and middle classes by advocating a plan to stabilize the economy, increase the 
size and centrality of the federal government, and implement measures to minimize job 
losses and recession. The plan to stabilize the economy was not based on the ‘shock 
therapy’ inspired by the Washington consensus and promoted by Vargas; instead, 
Fujimori’s plan was to get inflation under control through “negotiated price control and 
wage indexation, only then should gradual adjustments be made in the prices of public 
sector good and services and in the exchange rate […] stabilization without recession.”55 
Fujimori openly opposed any sort of shock that would occur as the result of stringent fiscal 
adjustments, shocks that would inevitably hit the most destitute the hardest. The shocks 
proposed by the Washington consensus and Vargas would, according to Fujimori’s 
economic advisors, lead to further income concentration, a move likely to be politically 
suicidal for a new populist government. Austerity measures, Fujimori and his campaign 
argued, would further concentrate income and ultimately hurt the general welfare of the 
people.56 Aside from harming the administration’s popular image, the autogolpe also 
seriously jeopardized Peru’s readmission into the international financial community, 
making his domestic popular support even more important in order to boost the 
international community’s perception of the administration’s legitimacy.57 Fujimori’s lack 
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of affiliation with the established parties also helped him gain notoriety and popularity 
among Peruvians who viewed the established political parties with distrust.58 Peruvians 
hoped he was a leader that “could offer hope and new ideas to a nation wracked by social, 
economic, and political crisis.”59   
Fujimori’s background made him a uniquely qualified candidate for a populist 
movement; he was the son of Japanese immigrants, an agronomist, a mathematics 
professor, and a former president of La Molina Agrarian University, which made him 
appeal to a wide range of demographics. The advent of “Fujipopulism,”60 as Kay refers to 
it, seemed “dependent on executive philanthropy bankrolled by a liberal state.”61 To 
paraphrase, the kind of illiberal democracy and populist government that Fujimori created 
would not have been possible without enormous executive investment in shoring up 
domestic legitimacy.  
The autocratic, populist nature of Fujimori’s administration necessitated the 
maintenance of a positive portrayal by the media. Fujimori’s use of press manipulation was 
extensive and exceptional; the monopolization of domestic press and fusion of “criminality 
and authoritarianism”62 was virtually unparalleled in the Western Hemisphere during the 
modern era. He and his intelligence chief, Vladimiro Montesinoswere responsible for 
coercing, discrediting, and monopolizing the vast majority of the domestic press. The 
Servicio de Inteligencia Nacional (SIN) was Peru’s powerful intelligence service created 
in 1960, headed by Montasinos and charged with presenting the president as a legitimate 
and qualified leader. This partnership between the executive and SIN worked to undermine 
Fujimori’s political opponents and members of the opposition press corps.63 
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The executive moves that left Fujimori politically vulnerable deserve further 
elaboration, especially his attempt win a third term and the increasingly public evidence of 
the intelligence service’s extrajudicial activities. The 1993 constitution extended 
presidential term limits from one to two terms. The Congress that had changed the 
constitution to allow for a second term was the new Congress after the autogolpe, a 
Congress that was deeply sympathetic and indebted to the regime.64 Therefore, his attempt 
to win a third term was a political stretch beyond what was conventionally acceptable. The 
SIN’s extrajudicial activities included clandestine surveillance on the Peruvian press, as 
well as physical threats and assaults against political opponents and unsympathetic 
media.65 Arguably, the weakening of Fujimori’s political position limited his legal options 
to shore up domestic support, leading to use of diversionary force. 
Montesinos, the head of SIN, held enormous power in the government, maintaining 
a high level of respect and fear so that even Fujimori was loathe to cross him: “everyone 
who had dealt with Montesinos over the years had reason to fear him whether he was in 
power or not.”66 Montesinos’s job was to ensure that Fujimori’s hold on power maintained 
the administration’s legitimacy despite the bad press that resulted from the deterioration of 
democratic transparency and the autogolpe. A good example of Fujimori and Montesino’s 
abuse of power was the action taken against Fujimori’s former spouse, Susana Higuchi de 
Fujimori, who became an outspoken critic of her husband. She was a notorious 
whistleblower of Fujimori’s charity scheme, which involved the president’s Japanese 
relatives “mismanaging and trafficking in donations of clothing from Japan.”67 She 
quickly rose from critic to potential political rival. However, the Congreso Constituyente 
Democratic (CCD) nullified the threat by legislating an electoral law prohibiting close 
relatives of the executive from being eligible to become president, vice president, or a 
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congressional member, a law known colloquially as “Ley Susana.”68 She attributed the 
increased scrutiny of her travel, political dealings, and instances of abuse, including 
dispositions regarding Fujimori she considered torturous, to Montesino’s powerful SIN.69  
In 1992, after the autogolpe, Fujimori dramatically increased his rhetoric 
concerning the negative impact of Sendero Luminoso and made their demise his priority, 
which started with the capture of Guzman in 1992. The seizure of Abimael Guzman, the 
leader of Sendero Luminoso, in September of 1992, allowed Fujimori to divert public 
attention away from the autogolpe. Costa writes, even though the “fight against Sendero is 
by no means over, there can be no denying that with this one swift blow the government 
took a giant step toward recouping its prestige and regaining popular confidence.”70 More 
importantly, the capture of Guzman boosted Fujimori’s approval rating from 61 percent in 
August to almost 75 percent in September, a significant increase.71 This boost allowed 
Fujimori to push through Congress a two hundred million dollar reinvestment to help 
stimulate economic growth, a clear grasp for electoral votes in the upcoming election in 
January 1993.72 Fujimori’s rising popularity in the polls, and his ability to push through 
the economic reinvestment package after the capture of Guzman demonstrates that his 
administration had increased its relative power within the Peruvian government.  
Fujimori’s administration demonstrated its use of diversionary tactics in order to 
undermine international organizations and their attempts to democratize Peru. The 
Organization of American States (OAS) was the primary vehicle with which the United 
States, along with the other major western hemispheric nations, attempted to persuade and 
apply pressure to the Fujimori regime to decrease its authoritarian tendencies and hard-
handed tactics against Sendero Luminoso (which will be covered later in this chapter). The 
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OAS achieved only minimal success, and Fujimori and Montesinos were able to frame the 
OAS’s attempts to regulate the Peruvian democratic process as American manipulation. 
The CCD was the watchdog of the democratic process within Peru, and its powers were 
dramatically reduced under Fujimori’s administration, which was a major concern of the 
OAS.73  
Fujimori, along with SIN director Montesinos and his intelligence apparatus, were 
able to hold power despite major domestic turmoil and a glaring lack of constitutional 
legitimacy for a decade because of their understanding of the use of diversionary tactics 
and a stringent hold on the press corps. The limited media technology in 1992 paper 
newspapers and government regulated television stations made this generally successful 
control of the press possible, limiting the necessity of more robust or elaborate uses of 
diversionary tactics.74  
B. FUJIMORI’S ROLE AS A POPULIST LEADER 
As a populist leader, Fujimori needed to maintain a positive public profile. Fujimori 
falls comfortably in Crabtree’s definition of populist leadership as a “charismatic 
leadership and the cult of personality; authoritarianism and disdain for representative 
institutions; a penchant for corporatism and social mobilization; the use of nationalism and 
a degree of xenophobia against perceived ‘enemies.’”75 Crabtree continues, populism as a 
“means of social control rather than mobilization, typically involving a complex web of 
clienteles relationships at all levels of society,” which is equally in line with Fujimori’s 
populist strategies.76 Fujimori’s role in suppressing free press and obsession with public 
image fits perfectly with Crabtree’s interpretation of populism.  
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Despite controlling and owning the country’s most productive assets, the Peruvian 
state remained one of the weakest in the region during the 1980s and early 1990s.77 
However, as long as Fujimori kept popular support he could rule without the consent of 
established Peruvian institutions: as explained by Crabtree, “the populist tradition is, in 
large part, a reflection of this weak institutional development (the failure of institutions to 
meet popular demands), emerging because of the need to engage tacit support of the 
population without conceding political power.”78 In this context, Fujimori’s populist rule 
was dependent on popular support more than institutional support, which gave him greater 
incentive to use diversionary tactics.  
Throughout his initial campaign for president, Fujimori made impressive inroads 
with the rural population. Although by no means unique, his success and personal touch 
connecting with the generally excluded elements of society allowed him more freedom and 
power to ostracize the established Peruvian elites and formal institutions, players who 
traditionally were able to provide a check to the executive.79 He was even known to drive 
a tractor (referred to by the friendly press as the “Fuji-mobile”) at campaign events in a 
transparent attempt to appear in touch with the population outside of Lima.80 Fujimori’s 
flavor of populism depended upon his personality, as well as largesse provided by the state, 
the finances of which had been largely coopted by Fujimori’s party. Due to his popularity, 
Fujimori was able to push through economic austerity plans like Fujishock, which was 
Fujimori’s introduction of the Washington Consensus. Fujishock privatized state 
industries, liberalized the trading system, and other implemented other requirements of the 
International Monetary Fund into the Peruvian economy. Fujimori was able to survive his 
implementation of Fujishock, despite what was described as Lima’s transition to a city with 
“Bangladesh salaries with Tokyo prices.”81 Fujimori’s implementation of Fujishock, was 
far more politically acceptable than if Vargas Llosa had implemented the same thing, on 
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which Vargas Llosa had campaigned unsuccessfully.82 While this phenomena could have 
been a symptom of the Sino-Nixon effect, the results of the autogolpe did not have the 
same result; it took the capture of Abimael Guzman to temporarily restore the 
government’s popularity.83  
C. FUJIMORI’S FIGHT AGAINST SENDERO LUMINOSO 
Fujimori’s fight against established institutions put him at odds with entrenched 
political parties and the independent media. Fujimori’s regime was overtly populist and 
depended on popular support to counter the animosity from and disdain of the country’s 
traditional leaders. This made his fight against the Sendero Luminoso, and especially the 
capture of Abimael Guzman in September of 1992, paramount to pacifying any potential 
or active actors working against the regime. 
Sendero Luminoso had been a bloody thorn in the side of Peru since the 1980s, and 
provided an opportunity for Fujimori to win popular support using diversionary tactics. 
Sendero Luminoso was founded by former university professor Abimael Guzman, who 
started the organization based upon Marxist ideology. In 1980, Guzman launched his 
campaign to overthrow the Peruvian government and replace it with a socialist regime. 
Sendero Luminoso’s main goal, according to the Council on Hemispheric Affairs, was to 
“destroy existing Peruvian political institutions and replace them with a communist peasant 
revolutionary regime, while resisting any influence coming from other Latin American 
guerrilla groups like the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA), as well as from 
foreign ideologies.”84 Sendero also made it a point to thwart government sponsored social 
programs, directly challenging Peruvian politician’s ability to reach directly to the 
disenfranchised rural populations. There are several different accounts of exactly how 
many people were killed by the Sendero Luminoso, but by the time Fujimori came to power 
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at least 60,000 Peruvians had lost their lives in the conflict.85 Holmes and De Pineres 
describe the lack of discretion in the violence employed by both the Peruvian 
counterinsurgency forces and Sendero Luminoso in regards to targeting the poor, while the 
remainder of the country certainly felt the acute side effects of the conflict’s violence and 
aggravation of the rural populations.86 The enormous amount of internally displaced 
people, lost economic opportunity, and degradation of the government’s monopoly on the 
use of force had taken its toll on the rural population and deteriorated the nation’s belief in 
their government’s ability to govern their own territory.  
For Alberto Fujimori, operations against Sendero Luminoso represented a 
dependable option to ensure popular support; Sendero Luminoso was almost universally 
reviled, both among the rural population and the Lima elites. Graham and Kane’s project 
on relative influence of Fujimori’s spending on voting compared to changes in voting 
patterns illuminated the effectiveness of his counterinsurgency efforts in regards to popular 
support. Graham and Kane’s project recognized that the public judgment of an 
administration’s efforts was dependent mostly upon major economic trends and countering 
security threats.87 By the time Fujimori successfully executed his autogolpe in early 1995, 
he had less public support than he had previously enjoyed. Security was the most salient 
point for Peruvian voters, and as such was a priority for Fujimori’s domestic agenda. 
According to Costa, 
Fujimori’s counterterrorist triumph boosted his already impressive popular 
approval rating…. The capture of Guzman not only strengthened the 
president’s hand vis-a-vis the parties, but also allowed his finance minister 
to declare a recovery of confidence in Peru that would help boost economic 
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growth and lead to the reinvestment of the $200 million that citizens had 
withdrawn from domestic banks since 5 April 1992.88 
It is worth noting the particularly brutal counterterrorism and counterinsurgency 
efforts of Peruvian counterterrorism actors in their attempts to limit, repress, and eliminate 
the violent extremist organizations in Peru, particularly Sendero Luminoso. Sendero 
Luminoso was a domestic security threat and had qualities of both a terrorist organization 
and an insurgency, and could be defined as either or both depending on their strength, 
goals, and tactics.89 Guzman’s original intentions were to overthrow the Peruvian 
government and replace it with one sympathetic to his Marxist ideology, making Sendero 
Luminoso a clear candidate as a traditional insurgency, necessitating the need for 
traditional counterinsurgency techniques and strategies. However, as their insurgency 
progressed and it became apparent that such lofty goals as overthrowing the government 
were not imminently feasible, Sendero Luminoso displayed traits more affiliated with a 
terrorist organization, including targeted attacks and assassinations, prompting 
counterterrorism (CT) techniques and strategies to be employed against the organization. 
Despite the clear indications that Sendero Luminoso was a full insurgency in places, the 
Fujimori regime’s insistence that it be treated solely as a terrorist organization allowed 
government forces to employ measures appropriate to the threat.90 While Sendero 
Luminoso was correctly considered a “group of butchers who attacked government forces 
and agents and preyed on unarmed peasants, every person killed by Peru’s army and police 
forces was, ipso facto, a ‘terrorist.’”91 By defining enemies of the government as terrorists, 
Fujimori was able to employ diversionary rhetoric more freely, and evade more of the 
culpability regarding his administration’s security forces human rights violations.92  
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The tactics and techniques employed by government forces in an attempt to destroy 
Sendero Luminoso resulted in gross human rights violations. According to Paul, Clark, and 
Serena, even though the conflict ended with a victory for the Peruvian government with 
the capture of Abimael Guzman, the “means of achieving victory were controversial at 
best. The strategy and tactics employed by the Peruvian government were fundamentally 
inhumane if not outright criminal.”93 Much of the violence perpetuated by both the terrorist 
organization and governmental forces was an attempt to compel local peasantry to support 
their respective sides of the conflict.94 It is clear that “Victims of the violence came from 
all sectors of Peruvian society and included school teachers, government officials, 
peasants, business owners, drug traffickers, and actual combatants.”95 During the peak of 
the conflict in the mid-1980s Peru led the world in disappearances, and in the first ten years 
of the conflict around twenty thousand Peruvians were killed, a half million were displaced 
from their homes, and nearly $10 billion in property and infrastructure was damaged.96 
When the government began striking back in early 1981 its attempts were mostly 
“ad hoc and ill conceived.”97 While there are many examples of extrajudicial punishments 
and atrocities committed under the guise of counterterrorism, two major examples need 
highlighting: the Barrios Altos massacre and La Cantuta killings. The Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (La Comisión De La Verdad Y Reconciliación), which 
published its findings in 2003 on the government’s acts during the counterinsurgency 
operations, devoted separate reports for both the Barrio Altos massacre and La Cantuta 
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killings.98 Both of these atrocities occurred in the early 1990: the Barrio Altos massacre 
occurred on November 3, 1991; La Cantuta on 18 July, 1992, after the government 
unleashed its security forces in what Nelson Manrique described as the “indiscriminate use 
of terror against the peasantry.”99 Both atrocities were later used as evidence against 
Fujimori’s violation of human rights. 
The Barrio Altos massacre by the Grupo Colina (a military intelligence squad 
directed by SIN and Vladimiro Montesinos) murdered “fifteen civilians, including 
children, at a neighborhood chicken diner in Lima.”100 The government denied any 
involvement and military officials refused to testify. The administration then used a 
sweeping measure to halt any judicial inquiries into the Barrio Altos massacre.101 The case 
was not investigated until four years after the massacre, and helped contribute to the case 
against Fujimori for his human rights violations.102  
The case of La Cantuta, which occurred a year after the Barrio Altos massacre, was 
in response to Sendero Luminoso’s Tarata bombing in Lima which resulted in over 40 
dead. The La Cantuta incident involved the abduction, torture, and murder of nine students 
and a professor at Lima’s La Cantuta University by Grupo Colina. Grupo Colina then 
buried the bodies before uncovering and reburying them in another location after the 
congress had raised questions. The cover-up of the massacre garnered additional negative 
press for Fujimori; the body of Mariella Barreto, one of the student’s murdered, was found 
in 1997 showing signs of ante-mortem torture. Barreto’s colleague, Leonor La Rosa, 
appeared on television weeks after Barreto’s body was found, declaring she had been 
tortured and Barreto murdered in retaliation for press leaks. She claimed the leaks involved 
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Grupo Colina’s efforts to suppress both the free press and opposition politicians.103 These 
highly publicized accounts of governmental efforts to suppress domestic terrorism and the 
subsequent cover-ups proved detrimental to the Fujimori regime’s ability to retain power, 
and contributed to the eventual ouster of the administration.104 
D. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
Fujimori’s heavy-handed counterterrorism strategy reflected his attempt to take 
advantage of the importance that the Peruvian public put on domestic security. As has been 
previously stated, Fujimori’s approval rating improved substantially after the capture of 
Guzman, especially in the aftermath of the autogolpe.105 Fujimori’s aggressive attempts 
to subdue Sendero Luminoso indicates he was using diversionary strategy in order to gain 
more political capital, providing him with the domestic legitimacy necessary to acquire 
power with the Peruvian government.  
The populist aspect of Fujimori’s regime forced his administration to place a 
premium on popular support. He could not rely on previously established institutions, the 
free press, or the international community to support his claim to power, so his 
administration focused on manipulating, and at times coercing the free press to conduct 
aggressive counterterrorism operations against Sendero Luminoso. Fujimori used 
diversionary tactics in order to compensate for his reliance on popular support as illustrated 
by his efforts against Sendero Luminoso. The lack of institutional and press support 
catalyzed Fujimori and Montasino’s efforts to consolidate executive power and undermine 
both other governmental institutions and the free press.  
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III. VENEZUELAN CAUDILLISMO: USE OF DIVERSIONARY 
TACTICS AND DEPENDENCE ON POPULAR SUPPORT 
Nicolas Maduro’s use of diversionary tactics has been widely reported and 
generally accepted as one of his preferred tactics. Wyre Davies commented on Maduro’s 
diversionary rhetoric saying that “perhaps…that is the real reason behind all the talk of 
‘imminent invasion’ and ‘foreign aggression’: to create the emergency conditions that 
would enable the armed forces to deal with internal dissent.”106 While invoking the specter 
of foreign threat is not a new tactic from either Maduro, or his predecessor Hugo Chavez, 
this chapter will focus on Maduro’s use of diversionary tactics since becoming president 
of Venezuelan in 2012 and compare changes in public opinion and the administration’s 
rhetoric, specifically as it relates to using the United States as the primary adversary.  
Chavismo, the populist movement that supported Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, is 
also important to understand in order to grasp the salience and effectiveness of Nicolas 
Maduro’s use of diversionary tactics to shore up domestic support. Chavez relied on a 
“characteristic mode of linkage between voters and politicians, a relationship largely 
unmediated by any institutionalized party, and that it bases itself on a powerful, Manichean 
discourse of ‘the people versus the elite’ that naturally encourages an ‘anything goes’ 
attitude among Chavez’s supporters.”107 Hugo Chavez relied on this specific type of 
populism, commonly referred to in Latin America as caudillismo, for support for his coup 
as well as the continued popular legitimacy of his administration. Brian Loveman defines 
caudillismo as the “rule by any kind of pre-eminent leader who derived authority more by 
an ability, through force of character and patronage, to command the loyalty of a substantial 
band of armed followers, than from adherence to the rule of law or the constitution.”108 
Caudillos, the populist leaders that defined caudillismo, used violence, the threat of 
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violence, or other extrajudicial means, in many cases circumventing established 
institutions, to accomplish their own political ends. Chavez personified the populism of a 
caudillo, however it was his strong leftist, anti-globalism, and more specifically his 
tenacious anti-United States stance, that gave him a strong platform in the wake of the 
failure of several pro-Western, IMF-backed governments on the continent.109  
Nicolas Maduro’s ascension to power, the Venezuelan institutions that allow him 
to remain in power, and the strategies and rhetorical techniques he used to maintain power, 
were all created and cultivated by Hugo Chavez. Therefore, this chapter will explore the 
history behind the rise of Chavismo and the institutions and political strategies that allowed 
Chavez and now Maduro to maintain control of the Venezuelan state. 
A. THE RISE OF CHAVISMO AND THE CONSOLIDATION OF 
EXECUTIVE POWER 
Venezuela had a stable political history since the 1960s, maintaining a 
democratically elected government for over 40 years prior to the ascent of Chavez, which 
set it apart from other Latin American countries at the time. However, even with a 
democratically elected government, Venezuela has had pervasive problems, such as 
political corruption, which exacerbated the already dramatic divide between 
socioeconomic classes.110 Income inequality as measured by the Gini Coefficient was 48.8 
in 1994, with the top 3 percent of land owners owning 76.5 percent of the land.111  When 
Carolos Andres Perez (1989–1994) took office in 1989, he adopted and implemented a 
“difficult austerity program … as part of the effort to reform Venezuela’s economic system 
[that] require sacrifices from all citizens.”112 This reform was viewed as necessary in order 
to combat the enormous income disparity that existed in the country.113 The government 
at the time was forced to accept assistance from the International Monetary Fund after 
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Perez realized that the economy was unlikely to recover without IMF assistance. Perez 
planned to remake the economy along the lines of the Washington Consensus, something 
Alberto Fujimori’s (1990-2000) predecessors attempted to do as well, and in mid-February 
he implemented the austerity program which included devaluing the currency dramatically, 
raising the prices of necessary commodities and services like gasoline and transportation, 
and eliminating highly popular subsidies for the majority of food items.114 
The shock of the austerity program was immediate and dramatic, and it 
disproportionally affected the lower and middles classes. The austerity measures 
contracted the GDP by eight percent, causing the already declining purchasing power of 
the average Venezuelan to be reduced by half compared to 1980, and over 64 percent of 
the population was below the poverty line.115 The social repercussions of the austerity 
measures in Venezuela were severe, as illustrated by declining per capita income that had 
dropped by 34.8 percent by 1998 from its 1970 level.116 There were major economic 
benefits that came from the privatization of certain industries, especially domestic oil, and 
reduced governmental participation in the market, placing the Venezuelan economy on the 
path that would lead to enormous future growth. However, these benefits had negligible 
positive effects on the middle and lower classes largely due to the economic discrepancy 
between the highest social class and the rest of the nation, as well as noted corruption in 
the government.117  
It is relevant to understand that the price of gas and oil, and its influence on the 
Venezuelan economy, increased exponentially during the past few decades; between 1970 
and 1980 the price of oil increased by an astonishing 948 percent.118 During this time 
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consumers saw their purchasing power decline, the gap between rich and 
poor widened, and the elites (business people, politicians, journalists, and 
public officials) continued to maintain their luxurious lifestyles. More and 
more, Venezuelans were asking themselves where the billions of 
petrodollars had gone. The perception of corruption in government became 
a dominant theme in the popular press.119 
Urban poverty increased from 18 to 33 percent from 1980 to 1990, and the social and 
economic decline instigated many violent riots in major cities, including the capital, 
Caracas, where the protests became known as the Caracazo.120 This cumulated in a riot in 
February 1989 when citizens looted supermarkets and local shops until the military, under 
the orders of the Perez administration, restored order through force, resulting in hundreds 
of Venezuelan deaths.121 Government corruption, combined with increasing economic 
stratification and urban violence, created a society more susceptible to the rise of a populist 
leader like Hugo Chavez. 
It was within this political climate that Hugo Chavez began establishing himself in 
politics. Chavez’s public life largely began with his first attempted coup, which ended in 
failure in 1992 but resulted in increased notoriety among the population. Chavez’s 
reasoning for attempting the coup was salient among the Venezuelan population; he 
claimed the coup “provides for the correction of violations of the Constitution specifically 
where…corruption is concerned.”122 He emerged from the failed coup attempt appearing 
as a patriot, fighting corruption, and subsequently made promises to fight corruption, and 
develop the lower and middle classes socioeconomic condition.123 He was able to give a 
public address after the failed coup, which resulted in 20 dead and dozens injured. That 
address is considered his entry into politics, even more than the coup itself.124 The failed 
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coup began the process of unleashing political and social forces, the same forces that had 
previously surfaced during the 1989 riots, which “dramatically and irreversibly changed 
the country’s political, institutional, and economic landscape.”125 The failed coup attempt 
also set a precedent for attaining power outside the constitutional legal guidelines.  
Against this background, President Rafael Calera (1994–1999), the incoming 
president, pardoned Chavez in March 1994 during a general amnesty for all the military 
and civilians who had participated in the failed coup attempts.126 He was able to win the 
1998 presidential election with 56.2 percent of the popular vote.127 Calera continued his 
strategy of using populist rhetoric to criticize his rivals, the wave of recent privatization, 
political corruption, and even the armed forces, which he was convinced did not support 
his regime.128 Calera’s populist strategy set a precedent for Chavez’s rise to power, and 
Chavez’s popularity is what allowed him to create the institutions that kept him in power 
so long, the same institutions that keep Nicolas Maduro in power despite his lacking many 
of Chavez’s caudillo qualities. Chavez, in keeping with his populist image, labeled his 
impoverished constituents the “Fifth Bolivarian Republic” in order to clearly separate his 
movement from the social and political decline of the former Fourth Republic, which was 
headed by his predecessor President Calera.129 Chavez’s rise to power is commensurate 
with the Left Turn movement, the political period in Latin America named after the 
socialist traits of its governments. Other states during this period also had leftist 
governments rise to power, in many instances after years of political exclusion from the 
established administrations, including the administrations of Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva 
(2003–2010) in Brazil in 2002 and then Dilma Roussef (2011–2016) in 2010; Nestor Carlos 
Kirchner (2003–2007) and Cristina Kirchner (2007-2015) in Argentina in 2003; Evo 
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Morales (2006–2019) in Bolivia in 2005; Rafael Correa (2007–2017) in Ecuador in 
2006.130 
Chavez, and his ensuing administration, broke away from previous Venezuelan 
governments in several important ways. His party, the Movimiento Quinta Republica (Fifth 
Republic Movement or MVR), was “more a movement than a consolidated political 
party”131 in that it was more unorganized and had appeal outside of the traditional political 
spectrum. His administration purposefully weakened democratic institutions, especially 
legislative and media independence, replacing them with Bolivarian institutions that 
supported his socialist agenda,132 and created a new constitution that served as a guide to 
establishing the Bolivarian socialism his administration strove to implement.133 Many of 
the Venezuelan institutions that were replaced by those loyal to the Fifth Republic were 
schools, universities, ministries, and social programs that had direct contact with the 
Venezuelan people and therefore gave Chavez and his movement a greater ability to 
promote the movement’s agenda.134 The MVR, from the very beginning of its existence, 
served as the vehicle for Chavez’s rise to power. The movement consisted of a large group 
of civilian and military activists, and they were able to channel the popular desire for rapid 
change into political action, with Hugo Chavez as the leading front-man.135  
The democratic revolution that the MVR led, propagated by Chavez, directly 
contributed to the weakening of democratic institutions, mainly through a series of 
referendums through which he gained direct power over several branches of government. 
The first referendum, in 1999, was for a constituent assembly that would be used as a 
“vehicle for overhauling the nation’s neo-corporatist political system.”136 The referendum 
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replaced the representative model with one of direct popular support, which led to a 
powerful leader largely independent of and unchecked by the nation’s remaining 
institutions.137 This referendum, and two others in 2000, became the ways in which 
Chavez was able to gain direct power over several government institutions, including the 
National Assembly.138 The referendums also set the dangerous precedent of legitimacy 
based solely on popular support, further deteriorating the independence and power of the 
institutional checks on Chavez by allowing his regime to proclaim that it represented the 
‘true’ will of the people. The referendums succeeded in part because of the Chavez 
administration’s focus on the poor governance and corruption of the previous political 
system, thus perpetuating a cycle where deteriorated democratic institutions were unable 
to check Chavez’s power. Moreover, Chavez’s administration had more freedom to present 
more referendums limiting independent checks on the regime.139 The referendums also 
served to further the cult of personality, with the implication that Chavez personally had 
the mandate of the Venezuelan people, which further exacerbated the corrosion of 
democratic institutions.140  
The first popular referendum approved a new constitution that began the 
transformation into Chavez’s autocratic, populist regime that Nicolas Maduro inherited. 
The constitution “emphasizes that Venezuelan democracy is participatory and 
protagonistic, not merely representative.”141 The constitution also explicitly banned the 
privatization of the state-owned oil company Petroeos de Venezuela (PDVSA), an entity 
that provided the administration with the ability to control many aspects of Venezuela’s 
economy. Control of PDVSA gave the regime access to state-generated oil revenue, which 
allowed it to consolidate its control over a society that was becoming more and more 
dependent on the government for employment and social security.142 Both the referendums 
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and the new constitution shaped Chavez and his MVR’s Fifth Republic into an entity that 
was much more dependent on the person of Hugo Chavez, and less accountable to other 
democratic institutions. These conditions persist into the administration of Nicolas 
Maduro.  
B. FAILED COUP AND THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE U.S. RESPONSE  
Despite the popularity Chavez enjoyed during his first few years in power, by 2001 
he had begun to experience a marked decline in popularity. As the administration 
successfully passed referendums, created a new constitution, and cultivated Chavez’s cult 
of personality, the movement began to suffer defections as more moderate allies turned 
away from the MVR. At the beginning of 2002, Chavez’s approval rating had declined 
dramatically, falling to below 40%.143  
This left his administration vulnerable for the first time since taking over control of 
the Venezuelan government, and his attempt to bolster his ratings during this time is telling; 
he used polarizing and fear-inducing rhetoric to shore up support for his administration. He 
gave long televised speeches that broadcasters were required to air; the speeches again 
targeted the media, members of the opposition, foreign countries, and private businesses, 
encouraging the population to organize and defend the revolution. Despite the newfound 
resistance to the Chavez administration, he continued to push forward with attempts at a 
number of reforms, including the curriculum of the education system (by making it more 
in line with the Bolivarian ideology), land redistribution, and stronger ties to countries 
fundamentally opposed to the United States, especially China, Libya, Iraq, and Cuba.144 
This purposeful polarization, combined with increasingly negative polling numbers, 
contributed to the partial success of the 2002-attempted coup. The coup was unsuccessful 
due mainly to the actions of the interim civilian president Pedro Camrona (2002), who 
quickly began issuing edicts as well as initiating vindictive investigations against those in 
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the former government.145 The interim government quickly lost legitimacy and Chavez 
was soon back in power.146 
The attempted coup in 2002, during which some in the Venezuelan military 
temporarily overthrew Hugo Chavez and replaced him with Pedro Carmona, deserves 
particular attention, especially in regard to the United States’ response to the coup. As 
Crandall writes, “While it was loathe to admit it, the Bush administration’s response (or 
lack thereof) to the coup became as newsworthy as the coup itself. The impact of the 
officials’ fateful decisions on the U.S.-Latin American relations continues to this day.”147 
While the coup was ultimately unsuccessful, the ambiguous response of the United States 
had lasting implications and undermined the Bush administration’s official line of 
supporting democratic governments and democratic transitions of power. Chavez, and later 
Nicolas Maduro, would use this incident as an example of the intent of the United States 
to support a non-democratic transition of power in Venezuela.148 While Chavez’s 
relationship with the United States was never warm, the attempted coup marked the 
beginning of his administration’s perception of the United States publicly as a legitimate 
existential threat. Both Chavez and Maduro administration’s official rhetoric reflected this 
perception, and from this time forward focused on the United States, and other western 
powers, as much as it did on domestic threats. This view also had regional implications for 
the Chavez regime as the growing Left Turn movement in Latin America was already 
showing signs that it was largely anti-United States; the idea that the United States would 
support, however passively, a coup overthrowing a democratically elected Latin American 
administration made other governments more sympathetic to the Chavez regime.149 
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C. DETERIORATING RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES 
After the attempted coup, Hugo Chavez’s foreign policy stance became firmly anti-
United States, a position solidified during the Presidency of George W. Bush and the 
invasion and subsequent occupation of Iraq. The most infamous expression of this 
increasing animosity was Chavez’s speech at the UN General Assembly when he publicly 
ridiculed President Bush.150 His remarks began with 
the Devil is in the house … the devil came here yesterday and it smells of 
sulfur still today.… As the spokesman of imperialism, he came to share his 
nostrums to try to preserve the current pattern of domination, exploitation, 
and pillage of the peoples of the world. An Alfred Hitchcock movie could 
use it as a scenario. I would even propose a title: The Devil’s Recipe.151 
The rhetoric did not change when Nicolas Maduro took over in 2013 when he said, just 
days after his election, that President Obama was the “grand chief of all devils.”152 
Hugo Chavez, and Nicolas Maduro since he assumed presidential responsibilities 
in 2013, have openly favored a multipolar global political system, contrasting with the 
unipolar world order espoused by the United States.153 Chavez viewed Venezuela as a 
“small second power”154 in this new multipolar world. Venezuelan foreign policy under 
both Chavez and Maduro has acted against United States foreign policy initiatives in Latin 
America, partly in order to expedite the multipolar world order, but also because Caracas 
has viewed, and continues to view, the United States as a security threat. Many of 
Venezuela’s foreign policy initiatives exhibit many aspects of what Mark Williams refers 
to as “‘soft balancing’—a strain of balance of power politics whereby weaker states employ 
non-military tools to protect their interests, and to delay, frustrate, and undermine a 
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hegemonic state’s capacity to impose its preferences.”155 The Venezuelan tendency, under 
both Chavez and Maduro, to use soft balancing as a foreign policy technique, is 
complementary to the idea of internal balancing; in this case using diversionary tactics to 
balance against formal institutions.156 The low level of institutionalism and the popular 
aspects of the regime allowed Chavez and Maduro to balance internally to support their 
foreign policies.157 
Venezuela’s view of the United States as its most dangerous security threat has 
been consistent for both Chavez and Maduro’s regimes, and constitutes an additional 
reason why the use of diversionary tactics have been successfully employed by both 
autocrats.158 Deteriorating relations between the two countries supports the Maduro 
regime’s ability to amplify and continue this rhetoric, as well as ensure a sympathetic ear 
from the Venezuelan population.159  
D. MADURO’S USE OF DIVERSIONARY TACTICS 
From the beginning of his administration, it was evident that despite Maduro’s lack 
of charisma, he was able to retain Chavez’s strong executive powers. Michael Penfold 
writes that even before Maduro was elected president, he seemed “less concerned [then 
Chavez] about gaining popular support and will likely rely on state patronage networks and 
social programs to shore up his position.”160 This reliance on patronage, backed 
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extensively by corrupt government practices and access to illicit financing,161 arguably 
makes Maduro less susceptible to popular backlash than Chavez’s administration. 
Nonetheless, despite his administration being less vulnerable to domestic challenges, 
Maduro still utilizes diversionary rhetoric to hinder opposition groups.  
Indeed, the Maduro regime has used inflammatory rhetoric in many instances, 
including against private Venezuelan businesses and other domestic entities depicted as 
enemies of the socialist regime. Maduro once stated, after the PSUV defeated the 
opposition in a 2013 mayoral contest, that his “economic offensive against private 
businesses would continue and that, ‘We’re going in with guns blazing, so watch out.’”162 
His regime campaigned on economic reform in order to defeat the “shadowy economic 
conspiracy he incongruously blames for hyperinflation and economic collapse.”163 In 
2018, he focused on Venezuela’s economic failings, and although it downplayed the extent 
of the economic decline, he laid the blame primarily upon this shadow economy, a vague 
reference to private domestic businesses with Western connections.164 During a visit by 
Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas to Caracas in May 2018, Maduro made multiple 
references to “oligarchs”165 and their responsibility for the country’s economic issues. He 
even accused local businesses of artificially inflating prices prior to the election in efforts 
to delegitimize his administration’s economic policies.166 
Maduro invokes the United States’ past aggressions in Latin America as a looming 
national threat. During his inauguration speech in April 2013, which itself was full of 
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references to the U.S. threat, a protester stormed the sage and grabbed the microphone from 
Maduro before security was able to subdue the intruder.167 Maduro then used the incident 
to justify heightened security since the Obama administration was attempting to incite a 
coup. He called the Obama administration “fascists! They disguise themselves, but they 
have very evil intentions against not just our people but against the people of the 
continent.”168 He claimed the media was being controlled by the United States, specifically 
the “oligarchies of the continent—and those who rule them from Washington—who want 
political control of Venezuela.”169 During that same speech, he spoke of the people of his 
country harassment by the permanent aggression of the U.S. controlled media. He 
responded directly to U.S. President Trump’s use of the term Monroe Doctrine during 
President Trump’s address to the UN General Assembly the day before, saying the doctrine 
was an “imperialist expression of ownership of the Americas…which the United States 
wanted to continue giving orders to the world in the twenty-first century as it did in the 
preceding one.”170 Maduro’s rhetoric clearly reflected that of Chavez, using the United 
States and its foreign policy as a major threat to Venezuela as well as displaying open 
contempt for U.S. private industries. 
Maduro’s use of the United States as the primary culprit of Venezuela’s issues 
continued into 2019 as Kenneth Rapoza writes in February of 2019 depicting Maduro’s 
circuit with the international press; “Maduro has been doing the rounds with international 
media. Today it was the Associated Press story (which covered an interview by Maduro in 
which he blamed Venezuela’s economic difficulties on U.S. President Trump). Earlier the 
week, it was the BBC, where he said that humanitarian aid was a ploy by the U.S. to make 
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his government look bad.”171 In an interview with ABC News Anchor and Chief National 
Affairs Correspondent Tom Llamas in February 2019, Maduro constantly compared 
Venezuela’s deteriorating situation with that of the United States. When asked if he would 
allow Juan Guaido, the U.S.-recognized interim president of Venezuela, to return to 
Venezuela after his meeting in Bogota, he stated that the United States was “trying to 
fabricate a crisis to justify political escalation and a military intervention in Venezuela to 
bring a war to South America. U.S. using diplomacy have been anticipating all these 
attacks. This meeting in Bogota is a part of that policy to attempt to establish a parallel 
government in Venezuela outside of the constitution.”172 When asked directly about the 
possibility of a U.S. invasion of Venezuela, Maduro, after referencing to the U.S 
government as “the extremist government of the Ku Klux Klan that directs Donald Trump,” 
stated that the U.S. is interested in attacking Venezuela not due to humanitarian concerns, 
but because of its vast oil reserves.173  
Maduro launched his most dramatic attack against the United States in March 2019 
when he blamed the United States for conducting an attack on Venezuela’s electricity 
system. During a televised nationwide address, Maduro stated that the White House 
ordered this attack, which was a “demonic plot to force him from power by crippling the 
country’s electricity system with an imperialist electromagnetic attack.”174 He explicitly 
stated the U.S. ordered the attack, and then describes the United States’ strategy of war as 
criminal, citing examples from Iraq, Libya, Afghanistan and Syria.175 This direct 
accusation was in response to domestic issues, and can be viewed as an explicit example 
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of the Maduro regime assigning culpability to an external entity in order to divert popular 
dissatisfaction away from the regime. 
Hugo Chavez and Nicolas Maduro used rhetoric as a diversionary tactic to retain 
popular support. I argue that the above examples of incendiary rhetoric were attempts to 
shore up popular support for the Chavez and Maduro regimes and divert culpability for 
declining economic and social situations from their own administrations to that of the 
United States and its Western allies. While the institutional and financial backing of 
Maduro’s regime make it less susceptible to popular dissent, it continues to use 
diversionary rhetoric to steer public opinion in favor of the administration.  
E. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
Despite an entrenched democracy and powerful institutions, Hugo Chavez was able 
to ride a wave of populism into power, followed by his protégé Nicolas Maduro who took 
the reins of power in 2013 after Chavez’s death. This wave of populism, Chavismo, 
deteriorated Venezuela’s independent democratic institutions, putting power into Chavez’s 
hands in the executive branch. The populist aspect of Chavez’s rise to power and 
subsequent power consolidation required popular support to combat the existing 
independent democratic institutions, and both Chavez and Maduro employed diversionary 
tactics to shore up domestic support. While Maduro may not be as vulnerable as Chavez 
was to the whims of popular opinion due to his control over entrenched corrupt 
bureaucratic and administrative institutions, he has still employed diversionary rhetoric to 
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IV. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION 
This thesis sought to understand when and how Latin American leaders use 
diversionary tactics and the threat of force in the democratic era. Toward this end, it 
reviewed two case studies, Alberto Fujimori’s regime in Peru from 1990 to 2000 and the 
administration of Nicolas Maduro in Venezuela, from 2012 to the present. This chapter 
provides the results of this research. It first provides a comparative analysis of the two case 
studies, comparing both the credibility of the threats to each regime and the independence 
of the other political institutions in their respective governments, followed by the findings 
of the research, and a discussion about future research opportunities on the topic of 
diversionary tactics in a democratic milieu. 
A. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF PERU AND VENEZUELA 
The Peruvian and Venezuelan cases indicate the use of diversionary tactics and 
strategies in order to shore up domestic support. Both the Alberto Fujimori and Nicolas 
Maduro regimes employed diversionary tactics when their respective holds on power were 
tenuous.  These cases demonstrate that a nation’s history, its social institutions, and its 
governmental institutions can influence an administration’s use of diversionary tactics. 
Using the threat of foreign invasion, intervention or domestic violence appealed to Fujimori 
and Maduro as an alternative to public attention on domestic issues or executive 
consolidation.  
Table 1 depicts a comparison between the Peruvian and Venezuelan case studies, 
using Threat Credibility and the Independence of Political Institutions during the early and 
late periods of the administrations as the two variables. These values—low, medium, 
high—effected when and how Fujimori and Maduro used diversionary tactics in order to 
shore up domestic support or evade public attention on executive power consolidation.  
Each case study had different threats with differing credibility; Sendero Luminoso 
was a markedly more credible threat to Fujimori’s regime than a Western invasion led by 
the United States has been to the Maduro regime. The threat posed by Sendero Luminoso 
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during the early period of Fujimori’s administration is considered High and was the most 
salient issue among voters. The capture of Guzman and the resulting dissolution of Sendero 
Luminoso drastically reduced the threat to the regime; therefore, the Threat Credibility 
during the later period is Low/Medium. While the Maduro regime uses the threat of a U.S. 
invasion as its most potent threat, the lack of U.S. aggression as well as the almost three 
decades that have elapsed since the last major U.S. intervention in the region, the 
Venezuelan case study’s Threat Credibility is described as Low in both the Early and Later 
periods. 
The second variable is the Independence of Political Institutions in each of the case 
studies during both their respective early and later periods. Fujimori came to power as a 
constitutionally elected president and quickly found himself beset by opposition forces in 
other governmental institutions. However, through the autogolpe, pressure on the Peruvian 
independent media, and the success against Sendero Luminoso, he was able to limit the 
independence of Peru’s political institutions to a Medium. The later period saw a 
resurgence of Peruvian political institutions that were eventually able to pressure him out 
of government into exile in Japan, showing a High level of independence. Venezuelan 
political institutions have a Low level of independence in both the early and later periods 
of the Maduro regime. Maduro inherited an administration that was dependent on the 
executive for both political purposes and financing, and that situation did not change 
enough to raise the description above Low. 
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Table 1. Comparative Analysis of the Autocratic Administrations of 
Alberto Fujimori and Nicolas Maduro 
Administration 
Attributes 
Early Period* Later Period** 
Case Peru Venezuela Peru Venezuela 
Threat Credibility High Low Low/Medium Low 
Independence of 
Political Institutions 
Medium Low Medium/High Low 
*    Peru (1990–1995), Venezuela (2013–2015) 
**  Peru (1996–2000), Venezuela (2016–2019) 
 
1. Analysis of Threat Credibility  
The administrations of Fujimori and Maduro used the threat of violence as a 
diversionary tactic to divert public attention from domestic issues. The Fujimori regime’s 
diversionary threat, Sendero Luminoso, scores a High during the early period, while it 
receives a Low/Medium score during the later period. The Maduro regime’s diversionary 
threat, a U.S. invasion, has a Low Threat Credibility score during both the early and later 
periods. The Fujimori regime used the credible threat posed by the insurgent group Sendero 
Luminoso to divert attention, while Maduro used the threat of foreign intervention, 
particularly from the United States. Both threats had degrees of credibility that enabled to 
employment of diversionary tactics. 
a. Early Period 
In the Early Periods of the Fujimori and Maduro regimes, the credibility of the 
threat facing the Fujimori regime was High and that facing the Maduro regime was Low. 
With an estimated sixty-nine thousand deaths caused by the guerrilla war with Sendero 
Luminoso, the organization presented a credible threat to the Peruvian government and 
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society.176  Fujimori used the need for increased security to protect against Sendero 
Luminoso as a major part of his election campaign. His administration’s efforts against the 
organization, especially the 1992 capture of Guzman, increased his popularity enough to 
will a re-election in 1995 despite the negativity that followed the autogolpe. The definite 
credibility of both Sendero Luminoso’s capabilities as well as Fujimori’s concrete efforts 
against it successfully enabled his regime to divert public attention from his 
unconstitutional executive consolidation and suppression of the Peruvian media. 
While the threat from the United States has become more credible since the 
imposition of economic sanctions in 2017,177 the lack of U.S. aggression against 
Venezuela has reduced its credibility as a threat to the Venezuelan government. Despite 
this lack of credibility, Maduro has had success using diversionary rhetoric using the 
United States as the primary aggressor. Strong control over both political institutions and 
state-controlled media give Maduro advantages not available to Fujimori, which allowed 
him to use diversionary tactics successfully despite the lack of a credible threat. Maduro 
rhetorically connected the U.S. foreign policy to Venezuelan elites in opposition to the 
regime, thus extending the foreign threat to his domestic enemies. 
b. Later Period 
The Later Periods of the Fujimori and Maduro regimes differ in that the credibility 
of the threat against the Fujimori regime deceased from High to Low/Medium, while that 
facing the Maduro regime remained the same at Low. The successful counterterrorism 
operations against Sendero Luminoso, particularly the capture of Guzman, reduced the 
threat that the organization posed to the Peruvian population as well as Fujimori’s 
administration. The Maduro regime, despite the introduction of U.S. sanctions in 2019, is 
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at a low risk of a U.S. or Western invasion, therefore the credibility of the threat remains 
Low. 
Despite the difference in the credibility of Sendero Luminoso and a U.S. invasion, 
both Fujimori and Maduro were able to employ diversionary tactics successfully to shore 
up domestic support, and keep public attention away from domestic issues or their own 
attempts to consolidate executive power. Therefore, the credibility of the threat was not 
paramount to the success of diversionary tactics; both Fujimori and Maduro used them 
successfully despite the difference in credibility.  
2. Analysis of Institutional Effects on the Use of Diversionary Tactics 
Political institutions in Peru and Venezuela played important roles in the 
administrations of Fujimori and Maduro and their use of diversionary tactics. The 
independence of the political institutions in both countries differed; Peruvian institutions 
actually gained more independence from the early period into the later period, going from 
Medium to Medium/High, while those in Venezuela remained Low throughout both 
periods.  
a. Early Period 
During the early period of the two regimes, the political independence of Peruvian 
institutions was Medium, while that of Venezuela was Low. Fujimori’s rise to power was 
within the confines of the Peruvian constitution; he was initially lawfully elected in a free 
election, it was not until his later re-election in 1995 that his election was contested as 
illegitimate. Maduro, as Hugo Chavez’s chosen successor, had issues regarding legitimacy 
before he was even sworn in as president. However, Venezuelan political institutions have 
demonstrated less independence than Peruvian political institutions during the Fujimori 
administration.  
Fujimori was constantly at odds with the Peruvian government’s other political 
institutions. His use of diversionary tactics succeed in allowing his regime to conduct the 
autogolpe without a major drop in public support, especially after the capture of Sendero 
Luminoso leader Abimael Guzman. The degree of independence displayed by the 
50 
legislative branch and the domestic media were major reasons Fujimori employed 
diversionary tactics. His efforts, with the help of the SIN, to curtail press independence 
helped perpetuate his diversionary rhetoric, but the press’s independence remained largely 
at odds with Fujimori’s efforts to consolidate executive power. It was during this early 
period of Fujimori’s regime that the political institutions were unable to maintain enough 
independence to successfully combat Fujimori; however, they were able to maintain 
pressure on the regime. 
Maduro inherited a consolidated executive branch as well as a government 
financially and politically dependent on the regime, eliminating the need for him to conduct 
an autogolpe or other drastic consolidation efforts that plagued Fujimori. Despite the issues 
regarding his election in 2013, Maduro’s rule was not seriously contested until Juan 
Guaido’s ascension in 2019. The lack of independent political institutions in Venezuela has 
limited the need for the regime to employ diversionary tactics; Maduro, and Chavez before 
him, certainly used diversionary rhetoric constantly, but the lack of independent institutions 
make that use less necessary to ensure the regime’s survival.  
b. Later Period 
The later period of the Fujimori and Maduro regimes differ in that the Peruvian 
political institutions increased their independence to Medium/High, while those in 
Venezuela remained Low. Peruvian political institutions were able to eventually play a 
major role in Fujimori’s abjuration from the presidency, demonstrating the increased 
independence of those institutions. Venezuelan institutions have remained largely 
dependent on the Maduro administration. With the increased pressure from both Guaido 
and the international community to step down, Maduro has used diversionary tactics to 
pacify antagonistic elements within Venezuela, resulting in stagnated political institutions. 
The different levels of institutional independence between democratic institutions 
in Peru and Venezuelan case studies had limited effect on the propensity of the two 
autocrats to use diversionary tactics. Both regimes had legitimacy issues, and used 
diversionary tactics to shore up domestic support for their administrations. Fujimori’s 
aggressive consolidation efforts and media repression empowered Peru’s political 
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institutions against him, while Maduro was able to avoid such aggressive consolidation 
efforts initially because of his regime-sponsored government with limited institutional 
independence. 
B. FINDINGS 
A comparative study of the Peruvian and Venezuelan cases shows that a regime 
will use diversionary tactics and the threat of force in order to shore up domestic support, 
or divert public attention from events that portray the regime in a negative light, regardless 
of both the credibility of the perceived threat or the independence of other political 
institutions. Both the autocratic regimes of Alberto Fujimori and Nicolas Maduro used the 
threat of force, via diversionary tactics, such as diversionary rhetoric and extending 
culpability to non-regime elements, continuously during the periods discussed in the case 
studies.  
The difference in the credibility of the threat to the Peruvian government and the 
threats to the Venezuelan government demonstrates that the autocratic rulers employ 
diversionary force regardless of credible threats. Fujimori’s efforts against the real threat 
of Sendero Luminoso were tangible, and Sendero Luminoso was actively initiating 
violence against both the Peruvian government and the Peruvian people, while Venezuela 
has not had to contend with an impending U.S. invasion to which Maduro constantly 
alludes. While the increased economic pressure by the United States in 2019 has increased 
the credibility of the threat, Maduro’s use of diversionary tactics remained frequent. The 
credibility of the threat had little effect on both the Fujimori and Maduro regimes’ use of 
diversionary tactics.  
The difference in the independence of political institutions between the Peruvian 
and Venezuelan case studies had a minimal effect on either of the regime’s use of 
diversionary tactics. Fujimori used aggressive efforts to limit the independence of both 
Peruvian political institutions as well as the media, which negatively affected his 
popularity. However, his use of diversionary tactics remained consistent throughout his 
time in power, regardless of the independence of other Peruvian institutions. Maduro began 
his term as president with a consolidated executive branch as well as limited freedom of 
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the press; however, he has regularly employed diversionary tactics, such as diversionary 
rhetoric alluding to an impending U.S. invasion, to divert public attention away from 
domestic turmoil. The Peruvian and Venezuelan case studies both showed a steady use of 
diversionary tactics, which were minimally impacted by the independence of competing 
political institutions. 
The Peruvian and Venezuelan case studies show that autocratic regimes will 
employ diversionary tactics and the threat of force in an effort to shore domestic support 
or reorient public attention whenever they have the opportunity. Both Fujimori and Maduro 
were consistent in their use of diversionary tactics throughout the case study regardless of 
the factors discussed.  
As of this writing, there are major protests in several Latin American countries 
including Peru, which went through another autogolpe in October 2019.178  While the 
outcome of this autogolpe was markedly different from Fujimori’s in 1992—the Peruvian 
Congress quickly suspended President Martin Vizcarra—some of the rhetoric used by his 
supporters is similar to that employed by Fujimori. A member of Vizcarra’s New Peru 
party presents a telling example; “what has happened is that we have avoided a coup, a 
coup against the constitutional court and the president. With this dissolution, President 
Vizcarra has returned the power to the people.”179  The propensity to use diversionary 
force remains relevant in the Peruvian government. 
Nicolas Maduro’s regime continues to retain power in Venezuela despite the rise 
of Juan Guaido, Maduro’s increasing isolation in the international community, and 
aggressive sanctions by both the United States and the European Union. These 
developments have not had an effect Maduro’s use of diversionary tactics, despite the 
increasing credibility of the threat of foreign invasion. Maduro’s use of diversionary force 
continues unabated. 
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This thesis shows that Latin American leaders tend to use diversionary force 
whenever the opportunity arises. The frequency of its use does not change do to the 
credibility of the threat nor the independence of other political institutions. The threat of 
foreign invasion, intervention or domestic terrorism has a powerful rally around the flag 
effect that leaders use to increase domestic support for their regimes as well as divert public 
attention away from issues detrimental to their ruling administrations.  
C. FURTHER RESEARCH 
This thesis is centered on when and how Latin American leaders used diversionary 
force. Further research is needed to determine the effects of diversionary force and what 
variables contribute to its effectiveness. Efforts to pressure the Maduro regime by the 
United States and the European Union would benefit from knowing if the increased 
credibility of the threat increases the effectiveness of Maduro’s diversionary rhetoric, as 
aggressive economic pressurization efforts have had an effect on Venezuela’s economy.  
Additional research into the effects of an independent media on the effectiveness 
of diversionary force would also explain how important that institution is to maintaining a 
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